This paper provides a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the surge in blocking incidence of GATT panel reports during the 1980s and the variations in withdrawn incidence versus total disputes across different decades of the GATT regime. The study first suggests the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO) regime. The study then analyzes the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, when two-sided asymmetric information exists regarding panel judgement.
Introduction
Since its inception in 1947, the GATT has evolved into a comprehensive framework of international trade laws as it exists today under the WTO. The operation of the GATT/WTO system has, to a large extent, hinged on the effectiveness of its dispute settlement mechanism. This procedure allows member countries to challenge other member countries' questionable trade measures with reference to the GATT/WTO agreements, and hence serves as a mutual surveillance and enforcement mechanism. Beginning with meager treaty clauses, the dispute procedure was elaborated increasingly during the GATT years, but it was the adoption of the WTO dispute procedure in 1995 that fundamentally changed the nature of dispute settlement.
The customary practice under the GATT of requiring all decisions to be made by consensus posed a structural problem for the GATT dispute procedure. The defending party, by raising objection to consensus, could delay or block the procedure from moving forward, the most serious problem being the potential of the defending country to block an adverse ruling. The WTO dispute procedure established in 1995 altered several aspects of the GATT mechanism. The most significant was the removal of the consensus rule for adoption of rulings and hence the elimination of the blocking problem. A ruling made by a panel of experts will be deemed automatically adopted.
To guard against possible legal errors made by the panel, an appellate procedure was added. A panel ruling can be appealed by either one of the disputing parties. If appealed, the dispute will proceed to an appellate panel, whose judgment will be final and likewise adopted automatically unless there is a consensus against adoption.
Power politics, inherent in international relations, poses another threat to the efficient use of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism. Considerations of potential diplomatic cost (be it political, economic, or military) influence countries' decisions of whether to initiate the formal procedure for resolving trade disputes. During the dispute settlement process, power politics might also affect countries' ability to extract bilateral settlements and to carry on the litigation. To what extent power politics have intervened in the GATT legal system depends on the international support for using the dispute procedure to resolve trade conflicts. The data on dispute cases under the GATT regime during the 1950s-1980s showed a varied pattern in the number of filed complaints and their procedural outcomes across different decades. The pattern in the data corresponds to some interesting evolutions and movements in these decades, as to be documented later, which conceivably have affected countries' political considerations of using the GATT dispute procedure.
Although not immune from the influence of power politics, the WTO procedure, given its more automatic and rule-based structure, leaves less room for power play. The procedure has since established itself as the norm for resolving trade conflicts in the international community. This is reflected in the dramatic increase of filed complaints under the WTO procedure.
Most studies on the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism have been conducted by scholars of law and political science. 1 Bütler and Hauser (2000) was the first theoretical paper that systematically investigated this mechanism from an economic perspective. 2 They, however, focused on the WTO dispute procedure; the incentives and interactions of countries in using the GATT dispute procedure were left largely unaccounted for. Furthermore, their theoretical model maintained a complete information framework and thus excluded the possibility of "withdrawn or abandoned" cases. We observe, however, non-negligible amounts of such cases during both the GATT and WTO eras.
In a related literature on civil litigation, P'ng (1983), Nalebuff (1987) , and Bebchuk (1988) present some potential frameworks toward understanding withdrawn civil disputes. In these papers, negative-expected-value suits can be filed with the presence of one-sided asymmetric information, and as a result, these suits are withdrawn or dropped if a settlement fails. Upon closer inspection, however, these papers are not so satisfactory in explaining withdrawn suits, because the withdrawal outcome in these papers either does not arise in the equilibrium or arise in the equilibrium only if it is costless for the plaintiff to file and then to withdraw a suit. In practice, countries typically have to incur (pecuniary or nonpecuniary) costs by bringing a dispute under the GATT/WTO procedure.
Thus, the one-sided asymmetric information models discussed above can not predict withdrawn cases and fully account for the interactions of disputing parties in international litigations.
In this paper, I propose a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the incidence of complaints filed and their disposition (withdrawn, settled, ruled -blocked or appealed) under the GATT/WTO procedures. I adopt a two-sided asymmetric information framework which allows for potential litigation (political) cost, and explore the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism. The model's results indicate that as the political cost (relative to potential benefit) of using this mechanism to resolve trade conflicts increases for the complaining country, the dispute procedure is initiated less frequently, whereas the incidence of cases withdrawn or abandoned increases at first before decreases toward zero. This paper then investigates the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block or appeal a panel report. It is shown that under both the GATT and WTO procedures, there exists asymmetric disadvantage against the complainant.
The potential benefit for the complainant to block or appeal an adverse panel ruling is uniformly less than the defendant, while the potential cost for both to do so is the same. This disadvantage to the complainant is diminished under the WTO procedure compared to the GATT, but is not totally eliminated. It is also shown that as the level of legal controversy over panel rulings increases overall, GATT panel reports are blocked at a higher frequency. The propensity to block a panel report under the GATT, however, is generally lower than to appeal a panel report under the WTO.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a more detailed account of the evolution of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Section 3 sets up the theoretical structure of the dispute mechanism, including the payoff and uncertainty structure. In Section 4, the theoretical model is developed and applied to explain the stylized facts that we observe in the data. Concluding remarks are collected in Section 5.
Evolution of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
When the attempt to create an international trade organization in the late 1940s failed, the successfully negotiated trade agreement, the GATT, was left without a well-defined institutional structure. 3
Only a few clauses with regard to dispute settlement were contained in the original GATT, most of which centered around Article XXIII. The article states that a member country may request consultation with another member country, should it consider that its benefit expected under the GATT is being nullified or impaired by the other member country's trade measure. If no settlement 3 For more details, see Jackson (2000, p. 119) .
is reached between the parties, the matter may be referred to the "Contracting Parties" (the member countries), which shall investigate and recommend action or give a ruling on the matter. In appropriately serious cases, the Contracting Parties may also authorize retaliatory actions. Despite the skeletal framework of Article XXIII, the dispute settlement in the early years of GATT worked rather smoothly, thanks to its small and homogeneous membership. Disputes were resolved in plenary meetings by rulings from the chair or consensus votes of member countries. As the procedure evolved, it began to delegate members' complaints to "working parties," formed by interested governments. One remarkable development occurred in 1952 when the GATT started using "the panel on complaints." 4 A panel composed of neutral government delegates would be established to hear and rule on a dispute. They would act in their own capacities and independently of any government interests. This development marked the beginning of third-party adjudication of legal claims brought under the GATT.
Because only the Contracting Parties had the power to decide on a matter, a panel report had to be adopted or approved by the Contracting Parties before its rulings became binding. Because it was a customary practice of GATT to require all decisions to be made by consensus, the procedure was inherently subject to delaying or blocking by the defending party, which by raising objection to consensus could keep the panel procedure from moving forward: the creation of the panel, the selection of the panelists, the adoption of the panel report, the authorization of retaliation. However, this delaying or blocking problem did not begin to surface until in the 1970s, the notorious example being the DISC case brought by the EC against the US, and three US counter-claims. 5
During the Tokyo Round negotiations conducted in [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] , the GATT dispute settlement mechanism developed on dual tracks. On one hand, the negotiating efforts to strengthen the general dispute procedure of Article XXIII did not go very far. The resulting document "Understanding" 6 codified the established practices in implementing the procedure, but it was still ambiguous about whether the complainant had an absolute right to a panel process, and it did not take away the veto power of disputing parties in panel adoption. On the other hand, many of the new "MTN Codes," resulting from negotiation efforts to restrain nontariff trade measures, also created their own dispute procedures. They varied in the degree of rigor and automaticity, but generally appeared to grant the complainant an automatic right to panel procedures. In this respect, the dispute procedures under these Codes were stronger than the GATT general procedure. The consensus rule, nevertheless, was still upheld for panel adoption in these various Code procedures. 7
In 1995, the WTO was established following the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The new Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) procedure under the WTO significantly renovated several aspects of the GATT mechanism. No longer are the separate procedures under the Tokyo Round Codes valid. The DSU governs all parts of the GATT/WTO system and serves as the single, unified mechanism for dispute settlement. Furthermore, the blocking problem that had plagued the GATT procedure is completely eliminated. A complaining country is granted an automatic right to have a panel created. Thus blocking is prevented at this early stage. Most importantly, a panel report is deemed automatically adopted by the new Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Nevertheless, an appellate procedure is added as a safeguard against possible legal errors made by the panel. Either one of the disputing parties may consider appealing against the panel report to the Appellate Body (AB), whose judgment will be final and likewise adopted automatically unless there is a consensus against adoption. Thus, blocking a panel report has become virtually impossible under the WTO procedure. 8
Theoretical Setup
The GATT and WTO dispute settlement procedures can be represented by the game trees in Figure 1 . Suppose a trade dispute arises. The complaining country (C) detects that a trade-related practice implemented by the defending country (D) might be in violation of the GATT/WTO agreement or constitute "nullification or impairment" of benefits C expected under the agreement. C can consider whether or not to invoke the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure. If C decides not to file the case (nf ), nothing happens and the status quo welfare remains, which is normalized to be zeros.
If C decides to file the case (f ), it incurs (pecuniary or nonpecuniary) cost and benefit. The potential costs of bringing a complaint under the GATT/WTO include international political costs that result from an aggravated international relationship with the defending country. For example, 7 Hudec (1993 ), pp. 53-57. 8 Jackson (2000 the cost can be a loss of existing financial aid or preferential treatment provided by the defending country, or damage to the prospect of mutual cooperation between the countries in commerce or in politics. On the other hand, a government usually brings a case under the GATT/WTO in response to a demand from a domestic industry or lobby group. By complying with their requests, the government earns political support from these industries or lobbies, which can mean more political contributions or more electorate votes in the future. These potential international political costs and domestic political benefits vary with country pairs, industries involved, and international support for the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure. Let K f represent the political cost incurred by C in every period, net of domestic political benefit, by filing a complaint against D under the GATT/WTO. It is assumed that C incurs K f in every period once it files the dispute, unless the dispute is settled or withdrawn, in which case K f is incurred only for the period in which the dispute is present under the procedure. 9
In practice, C invokes the GATT/WTO dispute procedure by requesting consultation with the defending country D. This is indicated by the beginning of Stage 0. The ensuing negotiations between the parties may take various forms. Here the negotiation process is modeled as follows. Before the panel, the parties are also uncertain about the quality of the ruling that will be made. Depending on the trade measure in dispute and the GATT/WTO agreements invoked, a panel ruling can be subject to different degrees of legal controversies. Let L ∈ [0, 1] represent the degree of legal controversy that will arise over a panel ruling, and f (L|R) the probability density function of L given a certain ruling R, where R = {0, 1} corresponds to a "no violation" and "violation" ruling, respectively. In other words, f (L|0) is the probability that a certain degree of legal controversy will arise over a "no violation" ruling, and f (L|1) the probability that a certain degree of legal controversy will arise over a "violation" ruling. Intuitively, if the trade measure in dispute is more difficult or sensitive, higher degrees of legal controversies are likely to arise over the panel report. This is represented by a rightward shift in the probability density function f (L|R).
At the panel stage, a panel is established at C's request to hear and rule on the matter. 11
Under the GATT procedure, a panel ruling is not binding unless it is adopted by the Contracting Parties with consensus vote. Either party may consider blocking a panel report if faced with an adverse panel ruling. However, the diplomatic cost associated with blocking a report might prevent a country from doing so, unless the report is indeed subject to a large degree of legal controversy.
To model this concept, I introduce the notion of blocking cost function K b (L). For simplification, I assume it takes the shape of a decreasing step function, as illustrated in Figure 2 . This function has the simple interpretation that if the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling is large enough (L >L), blocking the report is diplomatically permissible and therefore it incurs no cost.
Otherwise, the cost is prohibitively high. Whether C decides to block a "no violation" report or not, no changes in D's trade practices will follow. On the other hand, when faced with a "violation" ruling, D can potentially avoid the implementation by blocking its adoption. Otherwise, the panel ruling will become binding and D will be obligated to begin the implementation at Stage 2.
Under the WTO procedure, the disputing parties lose their veto power over the panel report; however, they can challenge adverse rulings by resorting to the Appellate Body. For simplification, the cost to appeal a report (such as lawyer fees, etc.) is assumed to be negligible when compared to the value of the disputed trade measure or the political cost at stake. The dispute ends with no changes in D's trade practices if C does not appeal a "no violation" ruling. On the other hand, D is obligated to comply with the panel's recommendation if he does not appeal a "violation" ruling.
The case proceeds to the appellate stage (Stage 2) if either party appeals. During the appellate stage, the Appellate Body reviews the legal aspects of the panel report and makes the final ruling on the case, which may reverse the original panel ruling in favor of the other party. I assume that the reversal probability of a panel ruling by the Appellate Body is equal to the degree of legal controversy L over the ruling. In other words, the higher is the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling, the more likely is the decision to be reversed by the Appellate Body. The appellate review is enforceable if a "violation" ruling against D is made. The implementation is assumed to take place beginning Stage 3.
Under the GATT or WTO procedure, if a "violation" ruling is adopted, the defending country is obligated to remove the confirmed trade barrier. In case of non-implementation, parties can also negotiate compensations (under the WTO). As a last resort, C can be authorized to retaliate by withdrawing tariff concessions of value equivalent to C's welfare loss due to D's trade barrier. 12 In any of these outcomes, there will be a positive welfare transfer from D to C in every period. Let V denote this equivalent value in these three possible implementation outcomes. 13 Both C and D are assumed to have a common discount factor of δ per period of time, where each stage of the process takes one period.
12 I have abstracted from the potential enforcement problem where the complainant does not or can not retaliate after the defendant fails to comply with the panel's recommendations. This is beyond the scope of the paper and the extension is left for future work. However, as documented in Hudec (1993, p. 278) , 90% of cases with violation rulings were implemented in compliance with panel's recommendations under the GATT. If we take into account that some violation rulings were blocked, the compliance rate with "adopted" panel reports is even higher.
13 See footnote 15.
Theoretical Model and Implications
The theoretical framework of dispute settlement introduced above exhibits the structure of a dynamic game with two-sided incomplete information. The game can be solved backward starting from the panel stage. I first examine countries' incentives to block (appeal) panel reports under the GATT (WTO) regime at the panel stage, and then study their strategic interactions at the consultation stage. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept is used in deriving the results.
Panel Stage
Under the GATT procedure, after the panel report is issued and its quality revealed, the disputing parties may consider blocking an adverse ruling given its degree of legal controversy. The benefit for D to block a "violation" ruling is to avoid changing the trade measure in dispute, which has a continuation value of V 1−δ . Taking into account the diplomatic cost of blocking a report K b (L), D will block the report if and only if the legal controversy over the report exceeds the threshold level (L >L). Therefore, ex ante the probability that a "violation" ruling will be blocked by D is 1 − F (L|1), where F (L|1) is the cumulative distribution function associated with f (L|1). This probability is indicated by the solid shaded area under f (L|1) for the GATT procedure in Figure 2 .
On the other hand, C has no incentive to exercise his blocking power given a "no violation" ruling, regardless of the quality of the report, because no economic benefits will accrue (no changes in D's trade practices will follow the blocking) but the blocking cost is non-negative. Therefore, ex ante the probability that a "no violation" ruling will be blocked by C is 0.
Under the WTO with the new appellate procedure, the benefits and costs for disputing parties to challenge a panel ruling have changed as well. The expected benefit for D to appeal against a "violation" ruling is V + L δ 1−δ V , where the first term is the gain in delaying the implementation for one period during which the appellate process takes place and the second term is the gain that the "violation" ruling may be reversed with probability L and D can avoid the implementation completely. The expected benefit of appeal increases if the panel report is subject to a higher degree of controversy. This relationship is indicated in Figure 2 under the WTO procedure. On the other hand, when C faces a "no violation" ruling, the expected benefit of appeal is L δ 1−δ V , which is the gain that the "no violation" ruling may be reversed with probability L and changes in D's trade measure are required. Since the cost of appeal is assumed to be negligible, both C and D will always appeal regardless of L. Therefore, ex ante the probability of a ruling being appealed is 1. This is indicated by the solid shaded area under f (L|1) and f (L|0) for the WTO procedure in Q.E.D.
The data on the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism, as shown in Table 1, indicate that under the GATT regime, the defendant blocked the report at a higher frequency than the complainant given an adverse ruling. This may be explained to some extent by the asymmetric disadvantage against the complainant as claimed above. explained by the fact that the panel reports during the 1980s were subject to a higher degree of legal controversy, which according to Proposition 1 leads to a higher frequency of blocking. As introduced in Section 2, the Tokyo Round negotiations produced several new "MTN Codes." These Codes broadened the GATT's scope significantly and submitted more contentious and sensitive nontariff trade measures to international discipline. In general, it would be more difficult to rule on the legitimacy of a nontariff measure than on a technical tariff measure. Therefore, we would expect the panel reports to be subject to a higher degree of legal controversy overall in the 1980s following the Tokyo Round.
The proposition that the disputes invoking "MTN Codes" were more complex in nature and induced possibly a higher degree of legal controversy over resulting panel reports and a higher frequency of blocking, can be further supported by the statistics shown in Table 3 . In Table 3 , we see that the disputes invoking "MTN Codes" were blocked at a much higher frequency (58%) than the overall complaints (21%) during the 1980s, confirming that the "MTN Codes" were the major contributing factor of the increase in blocked cases.
Consultation Stage
We now proceed to the consultation stage. I first discuss the complainant's decision to continue or withdraw from the litigation if the defendant refuses to settle, and to accept or reject a settlement offer if the defendant proposes to settle. Given the complainant's strategy of paneling, I then analyze the defendant's settlement strategy. Finally, I derive the complainant's decision of whether to file the dispute or not, given the defendant's strategy of settlement. The equilibrium solution is derived for the GATT regime, although similar analysis can be carried out for the WTO regime.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , if C files the complaint, the dispute will end up in one of the three outcomes: ruled by the panel, withdrawn, or settled. Under the GATT regime, prior to the panel, C predicts that the panel will give a "violation" ruling with probability π c and that the ruling will be adopted successfully with probability F (L|1). In this case, C will receive the compensationequivalent value of V in every period from the beginning of stage 2. C also predicts a probability 1 − π c of losing the case and receiving nothing. Once the case is filed, C also has to incur the political cost K f in every period. Therefore, the expected welfare change in present value for C from a panel procedure is E∆W
s perspective, D predicts a probability π d that C will prevail in the trial and a chance F (L|1) that he will not block the ruling. Therefore, D's expected welfare change from the panel procedure is E∆W 
A complainant with π c ≥π c expects a higher payoff from the panel proceedings, and therefore will choose to continue the litigation. On the other hand, a complainant with π c <π c will withdraw the case. The threshold typeπ c as defined in (1) is the ratio of the political cost incurred by C relative to the value of the disputed trade measure, discounted by blocking probability and time lag in implementation. Asπ c increases, the dispute is politically more costly, relative to potential economic benefit, for the complainant to pursue. Therefore, there is less likelihood (1 −π c ) that the complainant will proceed to the panel if the defendant refuses to settle. In this sense, the threshold valueπ c can be interpreted as an indicator of the degree of power politics at play.
Complainant's decision to accept or reject a settlement offer:
If D offers to settle at the terms S, C is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer if the expected payoff from the panel proceedings is equal to the payoff from the settlement. The threshold level of π c such that E∆W p c = ∆W s c is:
A complainant with π c ≥ π c (S) is sufficiently optimistic about the panel ruling, and thus will continue the litigation. On the other hand, a complainant with π c < π c (S) will opt to accept the offer S. The threshold type π c (S) is therefore the highest type of C that will agree to settle at the terms S if offered by the defendant. 
We are ready to characterize the defendant's settlement strategy. Suppose S e is the unconstrained optimal solution to E∆W d (S) in (3). Use the first-order condition:
and the definition of π c (S) andS d . It is straightforward to show that
Note from (4) that the defendant's optimal offer rises as he is more pessimistic about panel judgement (higher π d ). The offer also increases if he believes he is facing a potentially stronger opponent (higher π b c ). On the other hand, the defendant's optimal offer decreases if the dispute is more costly for the complainant to pursue (higherπ c ) and there is less likelihood that the complainant will proceed to the panel if the defendant refuses to settle. As argued in the previous paragraph, the optimal offer S e is truncated below at π e = max{π c , π b c }, where settlement fails, and above at 
Complainant's filing decision and equilibrium outcomes:
Given D's strategy of settlement as characterized above, C decides whether to file the complaint or not. C's filing decision can be conveniently characterized by π e c , which is the lowest type of C that will file a complaint at equilibrium. By perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept, D's belief should be consistent with C's strategy at equilibrium; therefore, the condition π b c = π e c holds at equilibrium.
Given the presence of two-sided asymmetric information, it is likely for a complainant with π c <π c to file a dispute. These types of C face a probability that D will not settle and as a result they will have to withdraw the case and incur loss. However, there is some probability that D might settle. If the prospect of a settlement and the magnitude of the settlement offer are large enough so that the overall expected payoff from filing is nonnegative, this justifies their decision to file the complaint. This type of equilibrium corresponds to π e c <π c . On the other hand, under certain parameters, another type of equilibrium π e c ≥π c may arise, where all types of C that file will proceed to the panel unless a settlement is achieved. Figure 3 illustrates all the possible scenarios, where panels "FW1-3" represent three types of equilibria which include the possibility of withdrawal, and panels "FP1-3" represent three types of equilibria which do not.
In each panel, the type of defendant π d and the type of complainant π c are indicated on the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. In scenarios "FW1-3", the lowest type of C that will file a complaint is smaller than the threshold type (π e c <π c ). Following our analysis earlier, the
, and offers to settle according to the optimal scheme The following proposition summarizes the dependence of the equilibrium scenario on the parameters of the dispute. The detailed derivations are provided in the appendix. In addition to the six equilibrium scenarios illustrated in Figure 3 , define "NF" as the equilibrium scenario where the complainant does not file the dispute, regardless of his type.
Proposition 2 As the relative political costπ c increases for a complainant to pursue a litigation
under the GATT, the equilibria "FP1", " FW1", "FW2", "FW3" ("FP2") , "FP3", and "NF" emerge sequentially, if the discount factor δ is relatively large (small).
Proof . As shown in the appendix, the condition onπ c for the different scenarios of equilibrium to emerge is "FP1":
, "FP3": max{ ; therefore, "FW3" is not sustainable. Q.E.D. Figure 4 illustrates the dependence of the equilibrium scenarios on the parametersπ c and δ.
The equilibrium "FP1" arises ifπ c < 0, which corresponds to the situation where the international political cost by filing the dispute is smaller than the domestic political benefit (K f < 0) for the complainant. This is likely the case if the dispute involves a powerful complaining country relative to the defendant, and/or attracts strong domestic political support from within the complaining country. The equilibrium "FW1" arises if the relative political costπ c turns positive, and the equilibrium "FW2" appears next ifπ c increases further. As the relative political cost continues rising, the equilibrium "FW3" ("FP2") emerges, if the discount factor δ is larger (smaller) than 2/3, followed by the equilibrium "FP3". Eventually with even higherπ c , the equilibrium "NF" emerges.
Proposition 3 When the international political cost by filing a dispute is dominated by domestic political benefit for a complainant as in "FP1", the expected payoffs from all possible procedural outcomes are positive. Thus, the complainant will file the dispute regardless of his prediction of panel judgement (π e c = 0). When the relative political costπ c turns positive but is relatively small as in the scenario "FW1", it is still sustainable for all types of complainants to file the dispute, and as a result, the higher the relative political costπ c , the higher the incidence of complaints withdrawn. As the relative political costπ c continues rising, a complainant not sufficiently optimistic about panel judgement will quit filing (π e c > 0) as in "FW2". The filing threshold π e c increases monotonically with the rise in the relative political costπ c and does so at a faster rate. Thus, the incidence of complaints withdrawn starts to decrease with the rise in the relative political costπ c . This continues through "FW3" until the "withdrawal" outcome disappears, as in "FP2" and "FP3".
With even higher relative political cost, the complainant will not file the dispute regardless of how optimistic he is about panel judgement (π e c = 1), as represented by the scenario "NF".
Proposition 3 implies that if the population of trade disputes are uniformly distributed across different pairs of subjective predictions (π c , π d ), we should observe some systematic patterns of filing and withdrawal, corresponding to different levels of relative political costπ c . When the relative political costπ c is very low, a lot of complaints will be filed but relatively few complaints withdrawn ("FW1"). When the relative political costπ c is medium, fewer complaints will be filed but a lot of them withdrawn ("FW2"). When the relative political costπ c is high, even fewer complaints will be filed and relatively few withdrawn ("FW3"). Finally, when the relative political cost becomes so high, very few complaints will be filed and none of them withdrawn ("FP3").
If we look at the statistics for the GATT regime in Table 2 , we see that the pattern of total complaints and cases withdrawn varied across different decades. In the 1950s, 53 trade disputes were brought under the GATT legal system, ten of which were withdrawn. In the 1960s, the system basically fell into a void. Merely seven times was the dispute settlement procedure invoked, and no complaints were withdrawn. In the 1970s, the legal activities seemed to thrive again with 32 new cases filed and five of them withdrawn. This momentum continued into the 1980s when we witnessed a surge in both litigation (115 complaints) and withdrawals (40 cases).
To understand the data, we can apply the results from Proposition 3 and assign to each decade a likely level of relative political costπ c that might be experienced on average by all countries utilizing the GATT dispute settlement system. Judging from the amount of complaints and withdrawn cases in each decade, the magnitude of relative political cost for each decade, from small to large, is likely to be: 1980s, 1950s, 1970s, and 1960s . The corresponding representative equilibrium for these decades is likely to be "FW2", "FW2/FW3", "FW3", and "FP3", respectively.
As documented by Hudec (1993) , the GATT started with a small group of homogeneous countries. Most of them were small European states which were accustomed to using international litigation procedure in resolving conflicts. Therefore, the dispute settlement procedure of the 1950s was dealt with as common practice, with no significant feeling of hostility about it. Therefore, the international political cost of using the GATT dispute settlement procedure in this decade should not have been too high.
In the 1960's, two major changes occurred to the system: the European Community was established, which replaced the original six smaller states with one larger trade negotiating entity; and the number of developing country members expanded rapidly. Both groups demanded major exemptions from the GATT obligations and the former advocated a diplomatic approach to all policy conflicts, contrary to the formal GATT legal procedure. This "anti-legalist" position prevailed among developed countries, including the US, such that it generated an atmosphere in which formal legal claims were regarded as unfriendly behavior. Therefore, it corresponds to a very high international political cost in the model for initiating a complaint during this decade.
In the 1970s, the GATT began to rebuild its legal system with the Tokyo Round negotiations.
The U.S. reversed its antilegalist position, and among other countries there was a gradual awakening of interest in the dispute settlement system. Therefore, we can consider the political cost to have gradually come down in this decade, to the level of the 1950s, and to have continued to decrease throughout the 1980s after the Tokyo Round negotiations. The GATT dispute settlement procedure became a popular device for member countries to resolve trade disputes in this decade. Although we also witnessed earlier that a higher fraction of panel reports were blocked during this decade, and therefore the expected benefits from the litigation procedure for a complainant decreased, the decrease in political costs presumably exceeded the decrease in expected benefits so that overall the relative political costπ c decreased for a complaint during the 1980s.
Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical model to explain the stylized facts observed for the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper first studies the effect of legal controversy over a panel ruling on the incentives of countries to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO)
procedure. The paper then examines the effect of political power on the incentives of countries to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, in a framework of two-sided asymmetric information. It is shown that the magnitude of the political cost, relative to potential benefit that a complainant stands to gain from using this mechanism, determines the pattern of filing activity and the frequency of various procedural outcomes. This result, when confronted with the statistics on disputes in different decades of the GATT regime, provides an indicator of how well the dispute procedure has worked during various decades, in terms of how much this procedure has been subject to potential power politics. Table 1 and Table 2 . Note 2: The percentages in brackets refer to the frequency of a certain procedural outcome with respect to total complaints (which are completed). 
